“Sleeping Giant Awakens? The Middle Class in Thai Politics.” (Anek Laothamatas, 1993)

Anek Laothamatas. 1993. “Sleeping Giant Awakens? The Middle Class in Thai Politics.” Asian Review 7:78-125.

There were signs in the Thai political process that the middle class could become the “social base” of the country’s “fledgling democracy” (p. 78). By the end of the 1980s, “certain elements in civil society—political parties, politicians, student activists, academics, the business community, and the press—wrested a sizable share of power from the military-bureaucratic elite” (ibid.). In this respect, the military coup of 23 February 1991 “was a major setback to the process of democratization” (p. 79). But it soon indicated hope when a “business-oriented middle class” (ibid.) took to the streets, leading to the government’s collapse. Importantly, however, “Just as they were a major cause for the return of democracy in 1992, they were a force that facilitated the military seizure of power one year earlier” (ibid.). The middle class were against both “a corrupted and unprincipled democracy … [and] and outdated and internationally outcasted authoritarianism” (ibid.). The middle class wanted a democracy “with integrity, efficiency, and professionalism” (p. 80). But it also needed to understand the incremental nature of democratic politics, and they needed “an outright rejection of military intervention as an alternative to corrupted democracy” (ibid.).

“The rise of the middle class” goes back to the development of a public sphere before 1932. Yet, in the 1932 coup, this public sphere was sidelined to the advantage of “military support” and a constitution that included appointed members. Consequently, “the post-1932 leaders did not have to rely on the consent of the populace and electoral results as much as their ability to stage or suppress a coup attempt” (p. 81). Thus, much of the post-1932 period saw “the rule of successive military regimes” (ibid.). The middle class also had the disadvantage of being seen as aliens since most of it were Sino-Thai. Anek also refers to the standard argument that the population could not be “galvanized” (p. 82) because there was no “anti-colonial experience” and no “defeat in major wars” (ibid.). He adds to that the absence (largely) of “racial, linguistic and religious issues” (ibid.) that could have mobilized people. Phibun Songkhram and Luang Wijit Watakan tried their hands at the “creation of a new middle class of local origin” (ibid.). However, a real push in this direction only occurred during Sarit Thanarat’s rule (1957-1963). While the earlier attempt was based on nationalism, Sarit’s approach was developmental in its unleashing of market forces. Consequently, the middle class, especially in Bangkok and provincial centers, “grew substantially” (p. 83), though a great share was still made up by government officials. “But the impact of economic growth on the creation of a politically active middle class was immense anyway” (p. 84), especially by the expansion of college education. In the electoral field, during the 1980s, businesspeople-politicians were the largest group in the House. They drew much public and academic attention, and this included “mafia-type businessmen” (p. 85; chao pho). However, they added an element to the middle class, rather than replacing activists, trade unions, protests, and social movements.

It was not only their number that increased during the 1980s, but there was also a “marked shift in the official attitude regarding the part played by the private actors in public affairs” (p. 87f). [During my Ph.D. field research in Chachoengsao from late 1990 to early 1992, the officials in the provincial hall had switched from “development” to “private sector.” They had initiated the establishment of local chambers of commerce and the public-private consultative committee. Yet, when a big NGO-initiated conference on the environment was held at the Asia Hotel in Bangkok, the organizers thought in necessary to have a privy councilor open the event to avoid being seen as “disloyal” and directed against the existing political order. This caused some more independent-minded NGOs not to take part in the conference. At the local administrative level, such as district administrations, non-bureaucratic mobilization activities were still seen with mistrust and sometimes prevented from taking place for many years. See Andrew Turton 1987. M.N.] Anek notes that “businesses were publicly seen in a new light—not as alien exploiters but as indispensable partners in development” (p. 90). At the same time, non-governmental organizations (NGOs, in Thai they had a different connotation, being called “private development organizations”) gained increasing importance in the public discourse. [This was later overtaken by the more politically defined concept of “civil society.” Whether the reference was to “NGOs” or to “civil society,” the bureaucrats’ mindset overwhelmingly rejected both. M.N.] That the state sector opened up to private entities might be attributed to three reasons. 1) Constraints placed on state resources; 2) the discontinuation of the communist insurgency; 3) a “shift in the foreign aid community towards a participatory and indigenous approach to development” (p. 91). “By the late 1990s the state had intellectually [but not yet regarding its dominant worldview and neither emotionally, M.N.] prepared itself to see forces in civil society—especially those at the upper and middle level of society—assuming a more active and legitimate role in public affairs” (p. 91f.). This was mirrored by civil society becoming more politicized. Yet, its members were put off by the unprofessional behavior of politicians. [In other words, the politicians now did not only face a hostile state sector but also a hostile middle class. M.N.] “The political pessimism of the middle class was shaped by various opinion-making groups.” 1) The military: It was disheartened by the difference between the concept of democracy and its practice as exercised by politicians-cum-businessmen in Thailand. When a party-based election system was on the cards in early 1983, Gen. Pijit Kullavanij rejected it because “the system would admit only the ‘capitalists’ into parliament” (p. 92). And Gen. Arthit Kamlang-ek compared the highly qualified members of the state sector with the politicians’ “incompetence.” It was hard for him to swallow that those people would, as ministers, become the superiors of the first group. 2) Academics and the press: Of course, “vote-buying” became a standard complaint. From this perspective, both the candidates and the voters were “unprincipled” (p. 94). Democracy, “due to the ignorance of the electorate and the insatiable greed of the businessmen-cum-politicians—sadly turned into a leadership which was unqualified, unprincipled and self-seeking” (p. 95). 3) “TV news was crucial to the shaping of the political views of the middle class in the 1980s” (ibid.). This was based on a fundamental transformation of television, including liberalization and privatization.

In the mid-1980s, middle-class political preferences manifested themselves in the emergence of Chamlong Srimueang. It was this “shift in the voting preferences of the middle-class dominated electorate of Bangkok” (p. 96) that indicated the political views of the middle class. [The same logic applies to the overwhelming and continuous success of Thaksin Shinawatra’s political parties, only that they reflected the preferences of lower rungs in the social hierarchy. And it applies to the voting behavior in the 2019 and 2023 elections regarding the Future Forward and the Move Forward Party. Their electorate presumably was a mix of middle-class and working-class voters, much less rural-based voters, who were targeted by Phuea Thai and Bhumjaithai. M.N.] By the late 1980s, the middle class was “highly at ease with democracy in theory, yet cynical of it in practice” (ibid.). “Thai-style democracy,” from this perspective, was not so much characterized by military-bureaucratic interventions into the democratic process, but by the “disgusting” (ibid.) behavior of elected politicians. Thus, the middle class was rather pleased that democracy until 1988 “was a power-sharing scheme in which political parties and the military-technocratic alliance were counterpoised in opposition to each other” (p. 97) under the premiership of Prem Tinsulanonda, and his use of technocrats and their organizations to run his government.

The next section is headlined “The middle class and the road to the 1991 coup.” This started in 1988 when Prem stepped back to make place for Chartchai Choonhavan to take over. Soon enough, his government “came to be plagued with vociferous allegations of government corruption” (p. 99). Anek concedes that one must distinguish the truth of the matter from the perception of what was happening. Sectors of academia and the mass media turned out to be hostile. Likhit Dhiravegin, then a professor at Thammasat Universities faculty of political science, called the Chatchai government a “‘plutocracy,’ or, worse than that, a ‘buffet cabinet’” (p. 100). This was connected to vote-buying before elections, either by recouping such investments or as enabling them. Moreover, the NGOs disliked the government’s pro-business stance. Prawase Wasi noted that the entry of businessmen politicians into the policy process meant that their worldview would naturally gain precedence over other issues. In October 1990, a student at Ramkhamhaeng University set himself on fire. And the Federation of Students of Thailand held several public seminars on corruption at Thammasat University. Thus, discursively, a military coup became an option for getting rid of the Chatchai government, though the Far Eastern Economic Review in December 1990 still thought that people were “on balance more in favour of preserving the democratic gains won so far than allowing the military to step in” (p. 103).

However, it would be a mistake to believe that corruption allegations were a key coup-producing factor. Rather, “At the heart of the matter was that the fiercely proud military officers felt extremely indignant that their system and leaders were being criticized ‘unrespectfully’ by civilians” (p. 104f). [I remember that, at that time, Chalerm Yoobamrung persistently provoked the military. Many people warned that his behavior would not end nicely. M.N.] Unfortunately, one may say, the army at that time was not faction-ridden as so often before, but under the unified leadership of graduates from class 5. It was Chatchai himself whose promotions had created an army “under the exceptionally unified and politically ambitious leadership” (p. 105). They, in turn, could capitalize on the Chatchai-government’s poor treatment of high-ranking civil servants. Finally, on 23 February 1991, Chatchai and his entourage were captured at Don Mueang Airport before they were to leave for Chiang Mai. Though there had been an anti-corruption campaign and civil-military tensions, it is important to acknowledge that the coup “had a social basis in the middle class’s wavering position on democracy” (p. 108). [In other words, the putschists could be confident that important sectors of the population would support their action. This was an important motivational factor since the success or the nature of a coup depend on whether there is mass compliance or mass opposition, or whether the first is more widespread than the second. M.N.] On the one hand, the middle class did not believe that authoritarianism was better than democracy. On the other hand, they rejected authoritarianism “only in principle, while in practice holding that there could be a good authoritarian rule” (ibid.). Anyway, “the way in which they slammed democracy and the politicians paved the way for the return of the military” (p. 108f.), though the understanding was that the government had been disposed of, not the democratic system.

Given the events of 1991/1992, the next section is logically headlined “The middle class and the return of democracy.” There were positive steps taken by the junta, such as initiating the drawing up of a new constitution and appointing Anand Panyarachun to the position of prime minister. Still, the key issue for many was that democracy had to be returned as soon as possible, while liberal observers and NGOs remained “cautiously anti-coup from the beginning” (p. 111). But these groups had little influence. Yet, soon enough, it became obvious that “the military was trying to cling to power” (p. 111f.). At issue was that the prime minister did not have to be an elected member of parliament, and that the junta established their own electoral vehicle, the Samakkhi Tham Party. “The party, to the dismay of the middle class, largely comprised corruption-tainted politicians, including those originally charged by the junta-appointed graft-investigation commission” (p. 112). In late 1991, mass demonstrations took place against a constitution that was seen as undemocratic. Unlike in 1973, the “anti-charter demonstration was led and staffed in the main by non-students” (p. 113; “mobile-phone-carrying mob,” “sedan-driving mob”). Gen. Suchinda Kraprayoon, the junta’s leader, promised not to become prime minister after the election of May 1992. He reneged on this promise in April 1992, and in May 1992, mass protests comprising members of the middle class, often Thai-style “Yuppies,” followed. Anek’s take is that they were motivated by anxiety regarding their continued wealth creation if the soldiers did not return to their barracks. [This sounds like the motivations that Anderson detected in those middle-class elements that supported the 1976 military coup. M.N.] Yet, it was in fact workers and the urban poor that “really kept the movement alive,” “while a large portion of the middle-class demonstrators fled the scene,” due to the “firing power of the troops” (p. 117). It was their “fearless and ceaseless regrouping, in particular, [which] brought the much-needed time for the monarchy to step in to stop the brutal crackdown” (ibid.). But without the middle class, no movement would have been formed. [It is mysterious how Anek managed to overlook the important role that Chamlong Srimueang played in galvanizing the protests. M.N.]

The final section is about “The middle class and the prospect of democracy.” Opposing military rule and creating democracy are different issues. Anek notes that it “cannot be ruled out” that the middle class will again support military intervention when it is perceived that democracy causes problems. “To be permissive of coup-making, however, is close to playing with fire” (p. 119). [The coups of 2006 and 2014—each in their different ways—underscore this point. This goes especially for Prayuth, who stayed in power for almost five years. M.N.] The middle class must “abandon the long-held idea of using a coup attempt as a means to counter democratic excesses or imperfections” (ibid.). The middle class needs “a new political outlook which entails a more patient and practical approach to democratization” (ibid.). This outlook should also be “much more sociological than moralistic” (ibid.). Thus, it is not only the rural voters who need “reschooling” (p. 120) but also the middle class. They must give up the view that “impropriety and incompetence … are unavoidable, having originated mainly from an unqualified popular mandate” (ibid.). Middle class members must abandon the idea that the use of force and a popular mandate are equally legitimate means to acquire power, if it is only used efficiently and with integrity. And they must understand the nature of patron-client relations that lie at the heart of voting behavior in rural areas. Candidates and voters act according to “the existing social norm” (p. 122). The huge socio-economic gap between urban and rural areas has led to quite different conceptions of democracy, one based on individualism, the other on the solution of problems and grievances. The middle-class version has been made dominant and then used to criticize the rural version. Yet, the task is not moral condemnation but analytical understanding. At the same time, however, institutional solutions must be devised that limit corruption and vote-buying “while increasing the possibility for capable candidates acceptable to the educated middle class to get elected to the House of Representatives” (p. 124). Moreover, the middle class “must earnestly lend support to a rural development which will turn patronage-ridden villages into small towns of middle-class farmers or well-paid workers” (p. 124f.). Therefore, the key task is affecting a fundamental “socio-economic transformation (p. 125) of Thailand’s rural political economy.