CIA. “Thai Politics in Transition.” (November, 1975.)
CIA. “Thai Politics in Transition.” November 1975. (Two versions, one 16 pp., the other 28 pp.) (The summary is of the longer version.]
Before the author (his name is blackened as are several paragraphs) moves to assess what the implications of the Thai situation for the US are, he inserts a section headlined “What lies ahead) (pp. 24-26). He notes that the “incipient leftist movement is out of favor with the public” (p. 24) and that its alliance with the workers “has not been sustained” (ibid.). The military is said to be still doubtful of the new kind of governmental order and practice. Moreover, it is “prepared to reinsert themselves in a stronger role if conditions seriously degenerate” (p. 25). However, the ambitious military officers are also “impatient with [their] diminished power” (ibid.). Nevertheless, “Another military coup would not be acceptable without protest except under the most pressing circumstances” (ibid.). The form of government after a coup would probably be different from earlier times when the country’s government was run like a fiefdom by some generals for their own material benefits. That is, there would not be “a return to a narrowly-based military oligarchy” (ibid.). Though the country might well return to an authoritarian system, the civilian elite/technocrats would resist again being excluded from its operations. For groups that have newly developed in the past years, such as students, reformist businesspeople, the intelligentsia, labor activists, or political parties, “their influence probably will remain marginal for a long time” (ibid.). [That of the farmers apparently was so small that he did not even mention them. This is peculiar since the report is dated November 1975, and between February and August 1975, 19 leaders and members of the Farmers’ Federation of Thailand became victims of targeted assassinations. One would have thought that this did not escape the attention of a CIA-affiliated author. M.N.] There is a “general consensus” (p. 26) that there must be some adjustments to how the political system operates. Yet, the “conservative ruling establishment is not prepared to open up the political system too far” (ibid.). From this perspective, “Thailand is something of a paradigm for a society in transition” (ibid.). A more fundamental conceptual problem the author sees is that “The underlying principles of representative government remain alien to most Thai” (p. 25). In this context, the author wonders how democratic government can be sustained “when there is little basic commitment to the conceptual underpinnings” (ibid.).
Before the author comes to these conclusions, he provides some historical background: “The 1932 coup introduced a facade of Western-style institutions of representative government, but, in fact, the monarchy was simply replaced as ruler of the bureaucracy by an expanded group of political actors from the bureaucracy itself” (p. 7). Since that event, “The tradition of bureaucracy-dominated government … [has become] so firmly entrenched that it is difficult to foresee its significant erosion in the near future” (ibid.)]. [Seen from 1975, does 2025 count as “near future,” and does what we see today count as a “significant erosion”? M.N.] This also because political parties are not only weak and ineffective but “basically alien to the Thai bureaucratic culture” (ibid.). Political loyalty centers around personalized cliques based on loyalty to the leader and not to an idea or viewpoint” (ibid.). In turn, this situation is an outcome of the patron-client system “that underlies Thai society” (ibid.). [Nowadays, one can still support the first sentence without, however, subscribing to its extension in the second. M.N.] Accordingly, “Clique politics in both military and civilian circles are fueled by personality and money. The leader who is gathering support reinforces the loyalty of his clients with the largesse of his patronage” (p. 9).
These general statements are followed by some remarks on the events of October 1973. Political parties reappeared but promptly demonstrated the “old weaknesses of civilian politics” (p. 12). The author goes as far as stating that there was a “basic incompatibility between a Western political party system and Thai bureaucratic politics, parties being “little more than personalized cliques” (ibid.). [How can there be such an “incompatibility” when such a “Western political party system” did not even exist, but only a weak informal personalistic clique system? M.N.]
This section is followed by a consideration of Thailand’s political forces: leadership, power brokers (army, king, civilian bureaucracy), emerging interest groups and protest politics (students, labor, farmers, the right wing). “Leadership” is rather mixed. On the one hand, there is Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj and his “relative liberalism” (p. 13). On the other hand, there are the remnants of Thanom/Praphat’s political vehicle, the United Thai Peoples Party, mainly in the form of the Thai Nation Party [Chart Thai]. Its leader, Praman Adireksan, is the defense minister. He “belongs to the Phin-Phao clique of the 1947 Coup Group that installed Field Marshal Phibun Songkhram as dictator from 1948-1957” (ibid.). Praman’s brother-in-law, Chatchai Choonhavan, is foreign minister. [This is about the infamous Rajakhru clique and its role during a certain period of Thai politics. See นรนิติ 2553. M.N.] Kukrit’s power base is small so that he depends on such people’s goodwill.
First among the “power brokers,” of course, is the army. It “is as much a political party as a security force” (p. 14). Moreover, it is closely linked to the country’s commercial class. The author calls this a “military/industrial [commercial] complex” (ibid.). He also thought that the emergence of a Young Turk movement was “highly unlikely” (p. 15), though he recognized the existence of dissatisfaction in the junior ranks. [A few years later, a Young Turk movement did occur. See Chai-anan Samudavanija. 1982. M.N.] The senior ranks shy away from destroying something for which “there is significant public identification with and commitment to this constitution” (ibid.). [Generally speaking, the military does observe public opinion, and it can use it to motivate a coup but also to opt out of this behavioral option that the monopoly of weapons always provides. M.N.] In addition, the constitution has “extra prestige” due to the king’s role in its production. “The military is sensitive to the King’s feelings and unlikely to move without at least his tacit approval” (ibid.). The prospects of a coup would increase, “When the situation has generated real public concern” (ibid.).
Afterwards, the author turns his attention to the king. He repeats his view that the king is “the most important unifying and stabilizing force in Thailand” (ibid.). However, as far as the students are concerned, he does not support their activists, not the least because of “his tendency to ascribe their militancy to communist influence” (ibid.). [One wonders whether militancy without communism would have been alright. M.N.] He had clearly been “shocked by the increasingly leftist coloring of the student activists” (p. 16). Though he sees them as a “disruptive force” (ibid.), he also insists that counterinsurgency should not only be done by using military approaches. Rather, it should include political and social measures. Nevertheless, the king “seems determined to remain aloof from the political fray” (p. 16f.). Given the history of his kingship, “he appears to feel his position too insecure to risk in political confrontations with the ruling elite” (p. 17). [It is remarkable that the king and the ruling elite were still perceived as being two separate entities at that time. M.N.]
Next in the list of “power brokers” is the civilian bureaucracy. Freed from strict dictatorial supervision, ministries such as interior or foreign affairs now have more space for policy action. Interior, especially, used to be “Praphat’s personal fiefdom for 16 years” (ibid.). Anand Panrachachun could not take the initiative at foreign affairs [only to be shunted by Thanin Kraivichien]. But given the overall conservative character of the government, any “dramatic shift in Thai foreign policy” (p. 18) was unlikely, though US diplomates were now required to pass through the ordinary diplomatic channels, rather than using shortcuts to the military leaders.
The emergence of interest groups is hindered by the fact that, “The idea of structural pressure groups outside the official bureaucracy is alien to the Thai” (ibid.). [“Alien to the Thai,” or merely impractical when the political system has been a harsh military dictatorship for decades? M.N.] On the other hand, though, “the rising level of political consciousness has generated growing political activity among students, labor, and farmers” (ibid.). Their structure is said to follow general patterns of Thai social organization, that is, they constitute “personalized followings behind a dynamic leader” (ibid.). Leftist students are said to “form the core of the emerging radical movement in Thai politics” (ibid.). They have come a long way from their middle-class backgrounds and their “bureaucratic mentality” (ibid.). This points to a broader value change towards materialism, “especially prevalent in the Thai middle class, the source of most university students” (p. 19). US-trained lecturers had great influence on the changing value orientations of their students. This looks different when one turns to the vocational students. “As long as the vocational students remain a frustrated, volatile and violence-prone group, they can easily be used by others as a sparking point for more widespread unrest” (p. 20). As for university students, “increasing communist penetration is probably an inevitable development” (ibid.).
Labor does not have importance among the “power brokers.” “Union organization is in an infant stage …” (ibid.). Like other social groupings, it also suffers from “personalized factionalism” (ibid.). Farmers are even weaker, although they provide 75% of the country’s workforce. Their political inactivity allowed the political forces in Bangkok to capture the country’s political system (my words). Farmers were neglected by successive governments and “their standard of living remains dramatically lower than that of their urban compatriots” (p. 22). However, there are signs that they begin to translate their grievances into political awareness and even political organization. Kukrit Pramoj perceived the farmers’ needs and pushed through the Tambon development grants that were supposed to be spent by Tambon-level organizations according to their own determination of needs. The author uses the expression “populist politics” (p. 23) and wonders whether such “personalized government is preferable to more institutionalized politics and, at this stage of their development, still possible” (ibid.). Increasing complexity of problems could make such an approach unfeasible. [As we would see in 2001, such “personalized government” was still possible, and observers of that approach still used the same label: “populist.” The assumption, then, seems to be that if a political system develops, policymaking processes increasingly occur in institutionalized structures, such as political parties and ministerial bureaucracies, while the role of individual political leaders becomes limited to that of moderators. Thaksin Shinawatra certainly was not merely a moderator, and he fits in well with a broader international trend of personalization of politics. M.N.]
Although right-wing political forces are listed after the farmers, the author’s treatment is very short and interrupted by two big, blackened paragraphs. Nevertheless, he notes that “The unchecked growth of violence—be it inspired by economic need or political ideology—can only increase the likelihood of the re-introduction of an authoritarian regime” (p. 24).
The rest of the text has already been summarized above. (Two versions, one 16 pp., the other 28 pp.) (The summary is of the longer version.]
Before the author (his name is blackened as are several paragraphs) moves to assess what the implications of the Thai situation for the US are, he inserts a section headlined “What lies ahead) (pp. 24-26). He notes that the “incipient leftist movement is out of favor with the public” (p. 24) and that its alliance with the workers “has not been sustained” (ibid.). The military is said to be still doubtful of the new kind of governmental order and practice. Moreover, it is “prepared to reinsert themselves in a stronger role if conditions seriously degenerate” (p. 25). However, the ambitious military officers are also “impatient with [their] diminished power” (ibid.). Nevertheless, “Another military coup would not be acceptable without protest except under the most pressing circumstances” (ibid.). The form of government after a coup would probably be different from earlier times when the country’s government was run like a fiefdom by some generals for their own material benefits. That is, there would not be “a return to a narrowly-based military oligarchy” (ibid.). Though the country might well return to an authoritarian system, the civilian elite/technocrats would resist again being excluded from its operations. For groups that have newly developed in the past years, such as students, reformist businesspeople, the intelligentsia, labor activists, or political parties, “their influence probably will remain marginal for a long time” (ibid.). [That of the farmers apparently was so small that he did not even mention them. This is peculiar since the report is dated November 1975, and between February and August 1975, 19 leaders and members of the Farmers’ Federation of Thailand became victims of targeted assassinations. One would have thought that this did not escape the attention of a CIA-affiliated author. M.N.] There is a “general consensus” (p. 26) that there must be some adjustments to how the political system operates. Yet, the “conservative ruling establishment is not prepared to open up the political system too far” (ibid.). From this perspective, “Thailand is something of a paradigm for a society in transition” (ibid.). A more fundamental conceptual problem the author sees is that “The underlying principles of representative government remain alien to most Thai” (p. 25). In this context, the author wonders how democratic government can be sustained “when there is little basic commitment to the conceptual underpinnings” (ibid.).
Before the author comes to these conclusions, he provides some historical background: “The 1932 coup introduced a facade of Western-style institutions of representative government, but, in fact, the monarchy was simply replaced as ruler of the bureaucracy by an expanded group of political actors from the bureaucracy itself” (p. 7). Since that event, “The tradition of bureaucracy-dominated government … [has become] so firmly entrenched that it is difficult to foresee its significant erosion in the near future” (ibid.)]. [Seen from 1975, does 2025 count as “near future,” and does what we see today count as a “significant erosion”? M.N.] This also because political parties are not only weak and ineffective but “basically alien to the Thai bureaucratic culture” (ibid.). Political loyalty centers around personalized cliques based on loyalty to the leader and not to an idea or viewpoint” (ibid.). In turn, this situation is an outcome of the patron-client system “that underlies Thai society” (ibid.). [Nowadays, one can still support the first sentence without, however, subscribing to its extension in the second. M.N.] Accordingly, “Clique politics in both military and civilian circles are fueled by personality and money. The leader who is gathering support reinforces the loyalty of his clients with the largesse of his patronage” (p. 9).
These general statements are followed by some remarks on the events of October 1973. Political parties reappeared but promptly demonstrated the “old weaknesses of civilian politics” (p. 12). The author goes as far as stating that there was a “basic incompatibility between a Western political party system and Thai bureaucratic politics, parties being “little more than personalized cliques” (ibid.). [How can there be such an “incompatibility” when such a “Western political party system” did not even exist, but only a weak informal personalistic clique system? M.N.]
This section is followed by a consideration of Thailand’s political forces: leadership, power brokers (army, king, civilian bureaucracy), emerging interest groups and protest politics (students, labor, farmers, the right wing). “Leadership” is rather mixed. On the one hand, there is Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj and his “relative liberalism” (p. 13). On the other hand, there are the remnants of Thanom/Praphat’s political vehicle, the United Thai Peoples Party, mainly in the form of the Thai Nation Party [Chart Thai]. Its leader, Praman Adireksan, is the defense minister. He “belongs to the Phin-Phao clique of the 1947 Coup Group that installed Field Marshal Phibun Songkhram as dictator from 1948-1957” (ibid.). Praman’s brother-in-law, Chatchai Choonhavan, is foreign minister. [This is about the infamous Rajakhru clique and its role during a certain period of Thai politics. See นรนิติ 2553. M.N.] Kukrit’s power base is small so that he depends on such people’s goodwill.
First among the “power brokers,” of course, is the army. It “is as much a political party as a security force” (p. 14). Moreover, it is closely linked to the country’s commercial class. The author calls this a “military/industrial [commercial] complex” (ibid.). He also thought that the emergence of a Young Turk movement was “highly unlikely” (p. 15), though he recognized the existence of dissatisfaction in the junior ranks. [A few years later, a Young Turk movement did occur. See Chai-anan Samudavanija. 1982. M.N.] The senior ranks shy away from destroying something for which “there is significant public identification with and commitment to this constitution” (ibid.). [Generally speaking, the military does observe public opinion, and it can use it to motivate a coup but also to opt out of this behavioral option that the monopoly of weapons always provides. M.N.] In addition, the constitution has “extra prestige” due to the king’s role in its production. “The military is sensitive to the King’s feelings and unlikely to move without at least his tacit approval” (ibid.). The prospects of a coup would increase, “When the situation has generated real public concern” (ibid.).
Afterwards, the author turns his attention to the king. He repeats his view that the king is “the most important unifying and stabilizing force in Thailand” (ibid.). However, as far as the students are concerned, he does not support their activists, not the least because of “his tendency to ascribe their militancy to communist influence” (ibid.). [One wonders whether militancy without communism would have been alright. M.N.] He had clearly been “shocked by the increasingly leftist coloring of the student activists” (p. 16). Though he sees them as a “disruptive force” (ibid.), he also insists that counterinsurgency should not only be done by using military approaches. Rather, it should include political and social measures. Nevertheless, the king “seems determined to remain aloof from the political fray” (p. 16f.). Given the history of his kingship, “he appears to feel his position too insecure to risk in political confrontations with the ruling elite” (p. 17). [It is remarkable that the king and the ruling elite were still perceived as being two separate entities at that time. M.N.]
Next in the list of “power brokers” is the civilian bureaucracy. Freed from strict dictatorial supervision, ministries such as interior or foreign affairs now have more space for policy action. Interior, especially, used to be “Praphat’s personal fiefdom for 16 years” (ibid.). Anand Panrachachun could not take the initiative at foreign affairs [only to be shunted by Thanin Kraivichien]. But given the overall conservative character of the government, any “dramatic shift in Thai foreign policy” (p. 18) was unlikely, though US diplomates were now required to pass through the ordinary diplomatic channels, rather than using shortcuts to the military leaders.
The emergence of interest groups is hindered by the fact that, “The idea of structural pressure groups outside the official bureaucracy is alien to the Thai” (ibid.). [“Alien to the Thai,” or merely impractical when the political system has been a harsh military dictatorship for decades? M.N.] On the other hand, though, “the rising level of political consciousness has generated growing political activity among students, labor, and farmers” (ibid.). Their structure is said to follow general patterns of Thai social organization, that is, they constitute “personalized followings behind a dynamic leader” (ibid.). Leftist students are said to “form the core of the emerging radical movement in Thai politics” (ibid.). They have come a long way from their middle-class backgrounds and their “bureaucratic mentality” (ibid.). This points to a broader value change towards materialism, “especially prevalent in the Thai middle class, the source of most university students” (p. 19). US-trained lecturers had great influence on the changing value orientations of their students. This looks different when one turns to the vocational students. “As long as the vocational students remain a frustrated, volatile and violence-prone group, they can easily be used by others as a sparking point for more widespread unrest” (p. 20). As for university students, “increasing communist penetration is probably an inevitable development” (ibid.).
Labor does not have importance among the “power brokers.” “Union organization is in an infant stage …” (ibid.). Like other social groupings, it also suffers from “personalized factionalism” (ibid.). Farmers are even weaker, although they provide 75% of the country’s workforce. Their political inactivity allowed the political forces in Bangkok to capture the country’s political system (my words). Farmers were neglected by successive governments and “their standard of living remains dramatically lower than that of their urban compatriots” (p. 22). However, there are signs that they begin to translate their grievances into political awareness and even political organization. Kukrit Pramoj perceived the farmers’ needs and pushed through the Tambon development grants that were supposed to be spent by Tambon-level organizations according to their own determination of needs. The author uses the expression “populist politics” (p. 23) and wonders whether such “personalized government is preferable to more institutionalized politics and, at this stage of their development, still possible” (ibid.). Increasing complexity of problems could make such an approach unfeasible. [As we would see in 2001, such “personalized government” was still possible, and observers of that approach still used the same label: “populist.” The assumption, then, seems to be that if a political system develops, policymaking processes increasingly occur in institutionalized structures, such as political parties and ministerial bureaucracies, while the role of individual political leaders becomes limited to that of moderators. Thaksin Shinawatra certainly was not merely a moderator, and he fits in well with a broader international trend of personalization of politics. M.N.]
Although right-wing political forces are listed after the farmers, the author’s treatment is very short and interrupted by two big, blackened paragraphs. Nevertheless, he notes that “The unchecked growth of violence—be it inspired by economic need or political ideology—can only increase the likelihood of the re-introduction of an authoritarian regime” (p. 24).
The rest of the text has already been summarized above.